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ESTABLISHING NORMS FOR PRIVATE MILITARY AND
SECURITY COMPANIES
DANIEL WARNER

SOME PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

In the Spring of 1992, in a lovely setting in Sweden just north of
Uppsala, I attended a conference of the Life & Peace Institute on "The
Challenge to Intervene: A New Role for the United Nations?" The
setting was lovely. Sigtuna is on beautiful Lake Malaren and the hosts
made every effort to see to our comfort.
The actual conference, as I remember, was not as stimulating as
the surroundings. What I do remember vividly, however, some 20 years
later, was that I made a comment at a plenary session, followed by a
comment by a small distinguished gentleman with a decidedly Indian
accent. The session soon ended and the distinguished gentleman
abruptly walked up to me and announced, "Let's go for a walk; we are
going to be friends for life."
I was neither shocked nor offended by the comment. Indeed, we
went for a long walk along the lake, and continued our conversations
bilaterally throughout the conference. In spite of all the efforts of the
conference organizers, the conference will not go down in history as
having made a major contribution to peace in the world. However, the
distinguished gentleman with a decidedly Indian accent had made an
astute prediction: Ved and I became friends for life. Whether it is in
Denver or somewhere else in the United States, whether it is in Geneva
or somewhere else in Europe, whether it is in serious discussions about
the world or exchanges about family; the distinguished gentleman with
a decidedly Indian accent was more than prescient and we have become
more than just friends.
We have not been able to see each other often, but Ved's friendship
has inspired me in several ways. First, he has opened a competition
with me that he doesn't even know about. When Ved was younger, he
vowed to visit every country in the world. He did quite well, except that
at the time of his travels there were certain large confederated
countries that eventually broke up, such as the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia. When I first visited Ashgabat and Almaty, and Skopje and
Ljubljana; I was so proud because I felt that I was in places Ved had
never seen. I had one upped him.
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Second, on my first visit to Denver, Ved introduced me to many
people; all of them his best friends, including federal judges. But what I
remember most was the way he introduced me to the people working in
the university cafeteria as his best friends as well. I had not seen that
kind of empathy and openness since I was on the campaign trail with
Bobby Kennedy. Everyone admired and loved Bobby, and I sensed that
all the people at the university admired and loved Ved in many of the
same ways, although Ved was not looking for their votes. He was
genuinely concerned about them, as they were about him.
Finally, I can mention one other Nanda inspiration. Several years
ago, Ved had an emergency operation that should have required some
serious R&R. Instead of resting, he resumed teaching at the university
in a wheel chair with 67 stitches still in his leg. Soon after, against
doctor's orders and to the consternation of his family and the
Chancellor, he flew to Geneva for a meeting of an organization that will
remain nameless, but which, like the Sigtuna conference, will never
change the world. When I met Ved at the airport and tried to scold him
for his irresponsible behaviour, he looked at me with his doleful eyes
and said, "Danny, they asked me to come and I just couldn't let them
down."
From speaking to youngsters in elementary schools in Denver to
explaining international politics in his tuxedo to the Lions Club; from
participating in doctoral seminars for Ph.D. students at prestigious
universities to vulgarizing complex problems in public media including
print and television; and from consulting with the most grass-roots nongovernmental organizations throughout the world to advising leaders at
the highest levels in the innermost circles of governments, Ved has
always been there for all who asked, and in this way, he is also an
inspiration to all of us.
At a prestigious international law conference, when former U.S.
National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said,
"All I know about international law I owe to Professor Nanda," she was
speaking for thousands if not millions of people throughout the world.
He has not just taught law; he has lived and exemplified a life of dignity
and respect for all.
NORM SETTING FOR PMSCs: BACKGROUND

In his distinguished academic career, Ved has written extensively
on so many subjects, such as human rights, graduate legal education in
the United States, international environmental law, international
dispute settlement in the United States, nuclear weapons and the
World Court, refugee law and policy, law and transnational business
transactions, and law in the war on international terrorism. In all he
has written, he has stressed the role of law and particularly
international law. He has tried to grasp the role of the normative in
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setting some type of standards for societal behaviour within and outside
the United States. Whether in the private or public sectors or whether
within domestic or international law, as a proper disciple of Myers
McDougal, Harold Laswell and the New Haven School of Yale Law
School, Ved has always been concerned with the interaction between
society and rules and norms, and not only in the formal sense of treaties
and domestic legislation. What follows is a very current example of the
international community, under Swiss leadership, trying to establish
rules and norms in the intersection between public and private sectors,
something very close to Ved's interests. In addition, the subject of the
intersection and private military and security companies is of the
highest importance as violence is no longer limited to interstate
conflicts.
Recently, various sources above the state level, such as
supranational bodies like the European Union, and below the state
level, such as non-state actors like multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the media, and armed groups,
have challenged the state-centric system initiated in the Peace of
Westphalia. In this new environment, there are several new private
threats to international security; among them piracy, organized crime,
and citizen militias.' Where States are no longer able or are unwilling
to provide security, private actors have stepped in or governments have
hired them to provide security. Private threats to peace and security
have increased and private solutions to threats to peace and security
have increased as well. 2 States and international organizations, such as
the United Nations, are hiring companies to provide traditional public
functions in the security sector, including military operations, mission
support, and security maintenance. Private companies have also been
involved in training police forces and state armed forces as well as
collecting intelligence information. 3 In addition, multinational
1. See generally Anne-Marie Buzatu & Benjamin S. Buckland, Private Military &
Security Companies: Future Challenges in Security Governance (DCAF Horizon 2015,
Working Paper No. 3, 2010), available at http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/Files/
DCAFO9/124737/ipublicationdocument-singledocument/da297ble-cOe5-4076-94fd-67ce94
5163a6/en/PMSCo20webo20version.pdf. This paper provides a most helpful overview of
the situation. The following summarizes much of the paper.
2. In terms of security sector reform and development, Abrahamsen and Williams
makes this point: "As the links between security and development have been increasingly
recognized, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become a central part of development
policy. Following a traditional Weberian concept of the state, these programmes are
almost exclusively focused on the public security sector, neglecting the extent to which
people in developing countries have come to rely on private security providers for their
day-to-day security needs." Rita Abrahamsen & Michael C. Williams, Security Sector
Reform: Bringing the Private In, 6 CONFLICT, SEC. & DEV. 1, 1 (2006).
3. See Simon Chesterman, 'We Can't Spy.. .If We Can't Buy!': The Privatization of
Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing Inherently Governmental Functions, 19 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 1055, 1055-74 (2008). Chesterman notes that private contractors are more
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companies and humanitarian organizations hire private security
companies for protection 4.
In the new security environment, private military and security
companies (PMSCs) 5 have developed as important actors in the security
sector. Indeed, the growth of private security companies has become a
worldwide phenomenon. Certain statistics from the recent Small Arms
Survey (Survey) are helpful in understanding the growth of this
phenomenon.6 Based on a review of seventy countries, the Survey
estimates that the formal private security sector employs about twenty
million people, which exceeds the number of police officers at the global
level, and holds between 1.7 and 3.7 million firearms. 7 Estimates show
that the security market is worth about $100-165 billion and growing at
7-8 percent. 8 The company G4S, for example, has an estimated 530,000
employees in 115 countries and Securitas has 260,000 people in 40
countries.9
Where I am now affiliated, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Swiss government have been
in the forefront of developing norms and principles for States as well as
a Code of Conduct for companies in this area; they are trying to bring
some set of rules and norms to the behaviour of States and private
security firms contracted, to hold the States and firms accountable and
to establish some form of oversight. There are several precedents for
this effort of private/public partnerships. For example: Voluntary
present than public officials in numerous intelligence services of the United States
government.
4. See ABBY STODDARD, ADELE HARMER & VICTORIA DIDOMENICO, HUMANITARIAN
POL'Y GROUP, THE USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY PROVIDERS AND SERVICES IN HUMANITARIAN
OPERATIONS (2008), available at www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2816.pdf.
5. The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good
Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies
During Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Montreux Document] defines PMSCs as 'private
business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they
describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding
and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places;
maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or
training of local forces and security personnel." Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Montreux
Document 9 (August 2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc
002_0996.pdf.
6. SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2011, STATES OF SECURITY 101-27 (2011). The Survey refers
to private security companies as PSCs while we refer to private military and security
companies (PMSCs), but we are talking about the same phenomena as the Survey
indicates that such distinction is misleading (p. 102) and we will continue, therefore, to
use PMSCs.
7. Abrahamsen and Williams estimate that the ratio of private security guards to
police in developed countries is approximately 3:1, while in developing countries it may be
as high as 10:1 or more. Abrahamsen & Williams, supra note 2, at 2.
8. SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2011, supra note 6, at 103.
9. Id.
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Principles on Business and Human Rights initiative deals with the
extractive industry;1 0 John Ruggie is the Special Representative of the
UN Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights dealing with
"Protect, Respect and Remedy"" in the Global Compact. These two
precedents have influenced two recent attempts to establish norms for
States and companies in dealing with private security providers. What
follows is a brief description of those two attempts.
THE MONTREUX DOCUMENT

In 2008, the Swiss Government and the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 following a series of intergovernmental
meetings over a three year period, joined with seventeen countries
including, the United States, the United Kingdom, China and France,
to endorse an agreement known as the "Montreux Document on
Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States
related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies
During Armed Conflicts" (Document). 1 3 It is the first international
document to describe international law as it applies to PMSCs in the
context of armed conflicts and list good practices to help States
implement their international obligations through national measures.
The Document is designed to be a guide to the legal and practical issues
involving PSMCs. The two stated objectives are: 1) to clarify existing
obligations of Contracting States, Territorial States and Home States;
and 2) to develop good practices, regulatory options and other measures
for the same at the national and international levels. 14 To date, over
thirty states have endorsed the Document of twenty-four pages and one
hundred operative paragraphs. There are no legal obligations
involved. 15 Indeed, the Preface clearly states that it is "not a legally
10. See Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, SECRETARIAT FOR THE
VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES

ON

SECURITY AND

HUMAN

RIGHTS,

http://www.Voluntary

principles.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
11. See U.N. Secretary-General's Special Representative on Business & Human
Rights, Bus. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CENTRE, http://www.business-humanrights.org/
SpecialRepPortal/Home/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
12. It is somewhat unusual for the ICRC to take this type of initiative and equally
unusual for the ICRC to be directly associated with the Swiss Government in this way.
The independence of the ICRC from the Swiss Government is extremely important to its
particular humanitarian neutrality. For a discussion of the relationship between the
ICRC and the Swiss Government and an excellent political understanding of the ICRC,
see DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE HUMANITARIANS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS (2005).
13. Montreux Document, supra note 5.

14. Id. at 9.
15. For an excellent insider's overview of the negotiations, see James Cockayne,
Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiation,
Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 401, 401-28
(2008).
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binding instrument and does not affect existing obligations of States
under customary international law or [treaty law]." 16
The Preface of the Document lays out three potential relationships
between PMSCs and States: Contracting States, including, as
appropriate, when PMSCs subcontract with other PMSCs; Territorial
States on whose territory the companies operate; and Home States
where the PMSCs are registered or incorporated.17 The importance of
these definitions and the inclusion of all three types overlapping in
most of the Document is that "they constitute an explicit recognition by
17 highly affected states that they have a specific duty to protect
human rights during the operation of PMSCs operating from their
territory, or with whom they contract regardless of the extrajurisdictionallocation of the activities of the private entity".18
In Part One, the Document recalls certain existing legal obligations
of States regarding private military and security companies.19 It lays
out the lex lata. Contracting States, the Document notes, have an
obligation within their power to ensure the PMSCs they contract
respect international humanitarian law (IHL).20 It is "a very public
affirmation by a diverse group of states, including the United States, of
the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human
rights to contemporary armed conflict." 21 It is a clear reminder that
States do not act in a legal vacuum in their relationships with PMSCs.
The difficulty, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) saw in the
Nicaragua v. United States case, 22 is the degree to which a court can
directly attribute the actions of a PMSC to a government. The ICJ, you
remember, said that there was not enough evidence to impute
responsibility for the flow of arms between Nicaragua and insurgents in
El Salvador.23 Thus, the Document specifically refers to PMSCs
contracted by States, eliminating any potential confusion. Article 7 of
Part I says, "Although entering into contractual relations does not in
and of itself engage the responsibility of Contracting States, the latter
16. Montreux Document, supra note 5, at 9.
17. Id. at 9-10.
18. Cockayne, supra note 15, at 406. (Italics in the original) Cockayne goes on to
recount the controversy during the negotiations concerning the exact nature of that duty.
19. Montreux Document, supra note 5, at 9.
20. Id. at 12.
21. Cockayne, supra note 15, at 403.
22. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. the
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, TT 109, 115 (June 27). In its judgment, the Court said: "there is no
clear evidence [that] the United States . . actually exercised such a degree of control . .
[For the United States to be
as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf .
legally responsible), it would in principle have to be proved that the State had effective
control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged
violations were committed."
23. Id. 1109.
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are responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, human
rights law, or other rules of international law committed by PMSCs ...
where such violations are attributable to the Contracting State,
consistent with customary international law." 2 4 We also note here that
the Government of the United Kingdom has decided not to engage any
PMSC that has not shown adherence to the Code of Conduct. 2 5
Territorial States, in the Document, also have the obligation,
within their power, to ensure PMSCs operating on their territory
respect IHL. These States also have the obligation to pass legislation
necessary to provide penal sanctions to persons violating the law as
well as to prosecute, extradite or surrender persons suspected of having
committed crimes under international law on their territory. Home
States and other States have many of the same obligations including
ensuring respect for IHL, similar to the obligations of the signatories to
the Geneva Conventions. Provisions are made for those in violation or
in serious breach of IHL.
Of particular importance and in anticipation of the International
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC), the
Document has a section on PMSCs and their personnel. The Document
calls for respect for IHL and human rights law imposed by national law,
although the status of the personnel is not clear. The Document says in
paragraph 24, "The status of the personnel of PMSCs is determined by
international humanitarian law, on a case by case basis, in particular
according to the nature of the circumstances of the functions in which
they are involved." 26 If they are civilians, for example, they cannot be
fired upon. If they are incorporated into the regular armed forces of a
State or members of a group under a command responsible to the State,
then their status changes, as does the question of prisoner of war status
according to the relevant Geneva Convention.
There are, as one would imagine, considerable debates in
international law concerning the engagement of PMSCs in armed
conflicts. 27 The question is whether in situations of armed conflict (inter
or intrastate) IHL and international criminal law apply to PMSC
employees. Most lawyers agree that if serious violations occur, national
and international courts can prosecute the employees. IHL and human
rights law also apply to States contracting them, States on whose
territory they operate, and States where they are incorporated.
Some arguments focus particularly on the status of the employees.
Are they civilians or combatants? Most of the employees do not partake
24. Montreux Document, supra note 5, at 12.
25. Guy Pollard, Charge D'Affaires, UK Statement at International
Ceremony: Private Military and Security Companies (PSMCs) (Nov. 9, 2010).
26. Montreux Document, supra note 5, at 10.
27. See SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2011, supra note 6, at 109.
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in actual hostilities, but that can be a blurry distinction if they are
involved in guarding a military base or intelligence gathering. The
traditional ICRC delineation of civilians and militants loses some of its
meaning here. Courts may hold superiors of PMSCs liable for
international crimes committed by personnel under their effective
authority and control, which, as previously mentioned, is always
problematic to prove. 28 For the moment, courts have prosecuted very
few PMSC personnel for IHL, human rights or criminal violations,
although incidents of armed violence by employees in Afghanistan and
Iraq have caused international furor. 29
Part Two of the Document deals with good practices so as to assist
States, who are not legally bound, to implement their obligations with
the proviso that "any of these good practices will need to be adapted in
practice to the specific situation and the State's legal system and
capacity." 30 The Introduction has several caveats repeating the broad
spectrum given to States to apply the practices where appropriate and
possible. The recommendations, it is noted, may also apply for
international organizations, NGOs and companies. The Document
makes various suggestions concerning the procedure and criteria for the
selection and contracting of PMSCs, as well as the terms of contract
with PMSCs, including numerous quality indicators. It encourages
Contracting States to monitor compliance to ensure accountability. It
gives special attention to the granting and terms of authorization to a
PMSC to operate by the territorial State as well as the Home State,
including sanctions if violations occur.
The significance of the Part Two is the providing of suggestions or
guidance on what good practices by States might be in dealing with
PMSCs. There are 73 "good practices" which have the potential to be
the cornerstone for the further development of regulating PMSCs, such
as the follow-up Code of Conduct. 3 ' In general, however, while the final
Document lays out the existing laws and the good practices, it definitely
moved away from attempts in earlier versions to emphasize victims'
rights to finally stress the legal obligations of the parties. In that sense,
the Document fell below the expectations of human rights groups such
as Amnesty International. But, in general, States were enthusiastic as
well as industry representatives as they saw the Document as a positive
28. "Prosecution by the International Criminal Court requires that an individual's
actions meet criteria for a crime under the ICC Statute. The ICC has jurisdiction over
individuals only, not corporations. This means that the Court has jurisdiction over the
managers of PSCs for negligence in the prevention of the commission of crimes by their
employees." Id. at 128 n.13 (citation omitted).
29. "In cases such as Iraq . . PMSC employees were granted immunity from Iraqi
law from 2004 to 2009. . . ."Id. at 110.
30. Montreux Document, supra note 5, at 12.
31. Id. at 12-26.
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step toward clarifying the legal obligations of States and companies as
well as finding an operative mechanism for regulation to ensure
accountability.
THEICOC
In response to industry demands, the Swiss government was
involved in a second initiative to establish international standards for
private security companies. The ICoC 32 is a supplementary measure to
any national governmental measures, but it stands as an outstanding
example of an industry trying to self-regulate. Its objectives are to
establish clear standards for private security providers based on
international human rights law as well as to develop an oversight and
compliance mechanism. In its explanation of the ICoC and how to
become a Signatory Company, the Swiss Government specifically states
that "[t]he ICoC itself creates no legal obligations and no legal liabilities
on the Signatory Companies, beyond those which already exist under
national or international law. However, you will be publicly affirming
your responsibility to respect the human rights of, and fulfill
humanitarian responsibilities towards, all those affected by your
business activities."3 3
After a series of workshops with different stakeholders and a
conference at Wilton Park in 2009, the Swiss Government and the
stakeholders generally agreed on the need for a structure for the ICoC.
Members of the private security industry and the Swiss Government,
with the help of certain facilitators such as DCAF, agreed on a final
version in September 2010.34 Fifty-eight companies finalised and signed
the ICoC in November 2010.35 By February 1, 2011, the number of
Signatory Companies had risen to seventy-one. 36 Currently, a multistakeholder Steering Committee (StC) is developing the operational
framework for the oversight institution. 37 Whereas the Document was
mostly a government initiative, the ICoC was an industry reflection on

32. See GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES,
http://www.dcaf.ch/Topics/Detail?lng=en&id=121492 (last visited Sept. 30, 2011); see also
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS,
http://www.icoc-psp.org (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).

33. Outline About How to Become a Signatory Company, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/
PSC o2011-01-17 - ICoCbecoming-a-signatory-companyDCAF.pdf (last visited Sept.
30, 2011).
34. Fact Sheet, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE
PROVIDERS, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/FactSheet ICoC March_2011.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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what it could do regarding respect for international humanitarian and
human rights standards.
The Preamble states that "the Signatory Companies commit to the
responsible provision of Security Services so as to support the rule of
law, respect the human rights of all persons and protect the interests of
their clients." 38 The ICoC is recognized as a founding instrument, and
the Signatories commit to working with multi-stakeholders to establish
objective and measurable standards based on the ICoC with "external
independent mechanisms for effective governance and oversight." 39 The
ICoC mentions Certification as the ultimate goal based on the
company's ongoing monitoring, auditing and verification. 40
The general provisions of the ICoC relate to performing security
services in complex environments. It explicitly states that it neither
refers to legally binding obligations nor seeks to limit or prejudice
existing international law. It is, quite simply, an example of soft law,
such as the Deed of Commitment of the NGO Geneva Call dealing with
armed non-state actor groups and the use of antipersonnel mines.4 1
Just as the Deed of Commitment is not a legal document, although it
has been signed by almost forty armed non-state groups in the City Hall
of Geneva with the Republic and Canton of Geneva as Depository, the
ICoC is a political commitment by companies to voluntarily follow a
code of conduct.42
38. INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS 3

(Nov.
DUCT
39.
40.

9, 2010), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONALCODEOFCON
Final withoutCompanyNames.pdf.
Id. at 4.
Id.

41. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HuMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 291

(2006); Humanitarian Engagement of Armed Non-State Actors, GENEVA CALL,
http://www.genevacall.org (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). As far as differences between the
ICoC and Geneva Call's (GC's) Deed of Commitment (DoC),
. . the key mechanisms for oversight, certification and implementation of
the ICoC are still under discussion, unlike the Geneva Call procedures which
are comparatively well in place now. The ICoC process allows companies to
sign the ICoC before going through any kind of 'certification' or external
monitoring, the procedures for which are expected to be developed by the end
of 2011. This is different from the Geneva Call approach, as the organization
holds sustained dialogue, meetings and discussions on implementation
before an armed non-State actor can sign a DoC. Presumably, once the ICoC
procedures are established, signatory PMSCs will need to undergo a similar
vetting process before becoming certified and will also be subjected to regular
external oversight. But until this happens, there will be no way of assessing
whether the more than 150 companies that have already signed the ICoC are
actually complying with its important provisions.
Correspondence from Nicolas Florquin, Senior Researcher, Small Arms Survey, to author
(July 25, 2011) (on file with author). Nicolas Florquin worked for several years for Geneva
Call and was the main author of the chapter on PMSCs in the Small Arms Survey 2011.
42. See GENEVA CALL, supra note 41.
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Not only does the ICoC relate to the companies in general, it has
very specific principles regarding the conduct of personnel, especially
dealing with the use of force, detention, and apprehending persons.
Separate sections deal with the prohibition of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as sexual
exploitation and abuse or gender-based violence and human trafficking.
The ICoC includes management and governance such that the ICoC
becomes incorporated into all aspects of company policy. The ICoC also
demands diligence as far as the hiring of sub-contractors, with special
mention of the management and use of weapons.43
Among the companies that signed in Geneva on November 9, 2010,
it is estimated that at least 80 percent of large, internationallyoperating companies have signed, but there are many small companies
around the world and it is difficult to estimate their importance. 44 It is
anticipated that another forty plus companies will be added to the list of
Signatories by August 1, 2011, but many of them are small maritime
private security companies. 45 Estimates are that companies
representing around 80 percent of money spent on international private
security services are included in the Signatory Company list. 4 6
The Document and the ICoC are reactions to the growing
privatization of the use of force and the rapid development of the
private security sector. Many government and industry abuses have
been well documented and there is no need to review them here. We all
know about Blackwater, XeServices LLC and Erik Prince. Reports that
the Central Intelligence Agency hired Blackwater to assassinate alQaeda members or the possible use of PMSCs to conduct authorized
peacekeeping operations have been hotly debated. 47 What is important
to note, and in relation to much of Ved's work, is the developing
crystallization of norms and principles to deal with the interaction
between the public and private sectors, and between the rule of law and
societal behaviour and to try to correct abuses. Ved is a lawyer, but he
is much more than that and the examples of the Document and ICoC
are excellent reminders of the continuing interrelationship between the
political and the legal, something very close to Ved's preoccupations and
the New Haven School, which so influenced his career. Questions of
security, equality, legitimacy and the protection of human rights are
never far from his agenda.

43. See SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2011, supra note 6, at 109.
44. Correspondence from Anne-Marie Buzatu to author (July 27, 2011) (on file with
author).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Mark Mazzetti, Blackwater Loses a Job for the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/us/politics/12blackwater.html?ref=blackwaterusa.
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CONCLUSION

I am neither a lawyer nor an international jurist. I do know enough
about the law to see in all of Ved's professional work a driving force that
Lon Fuller, the famous Harvard Law School Professor, spoke of as "the
inner morality of law" and its "unfolding purpose." Justice and dignity
drive Ved in his personal and professional lives to an extent that
inspires and humbles those who try to emulate his example. There are
those who write and preach about human rights, and there are those
who live human rights. There are those who write and preach about
being international; Ved lives the international and he has brought the
University of Denver into the forefront of international higher
education. In both his personal and professional lives, Ved has been a
unique example of humanizing whomever and whatever he encounters.
Indeed, the small distinguished gentleman with a decidedly Indian
accent has become more than a friend to me, as he has been to so many
people, and for that I feel blessed as should all who have had the
privilege to know him and work with him.

